


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# INTELLIGENCE


# BULLETIN



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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

OK Japan: Prime Minister Kishi's efforts to obtain ratification of the new US-Japanese security treaty are encountering increasing opposition in the Diet. While the Socialists have intensified their attacks on the treaty as a result of the U-2 plane incident, the greatest obstacle to ratification stems from continued attempts by Kishi's rivals in his own party to use the treaty issue to bring about his downfall. New difficulties may have been raised by the government's announced view on 10 May that the treaty does not prohibit US reconnaissance flights from Japan over Communist territory. 25X1

OK Communist China - North Vietnam: The joint communique issued during Chou En-lai's visit to Hanoi suggests that neither Communist China nor North Vietnam will launch a major propaganda campaign against Laos at this time. The Communists hint they would prefer to negotiate with the new government in Vientiane. While commenting that continuation of the present situation "would be dangerous," the communique avoids criticism of the recent election and says the Laotian situation can be restored to normal by peaceful consultation. The communique's support for the summit meeting, together with a similar statement by Mao Tse-tung on 14 May, suggests that Peiping and Hanoi do not intend to hamper Khrushchev's summit tactics by creating a Far Eastern crisis at this time. 25X1

OK Indonesia - Communist China: Friction continues between the Indonesian Government and local Chinese Communist diplomatic personnel over repatriation of Overseas Chinese. The Chinese Communist Embassy in Djakarta has protested the alleged "forcible house arrest" on 27 April of a Chinese Communist consul who was observing the processing of a group preparing to embark from Borneo. The alleged unauthorized departure of a Chinese Communist repatriation ship from a Sumatran port in late April is still under investigation. The Indonesian Government has also just banned a pro-Communist Chinese-language newspaper in Djakarta for "tendentious" reporting on the repatriation problem. 25X1

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Thailand-USSR: [A Thai Government decision on 13 May to allow the USSR to reopen a TASS office is probably designed to show Bangkok's bitterness over the recent US surplus grain deal with India. ] the USSR has initiated negotiations to buy \$4,500,000 worth of Thai rice.] The Bangkok press, taking its cue from the government, is embarked on a campaign of harsh criticism of American surplus grain sales.

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*DK*

Afghanistan - United Kingdom: The Afghan-Pakistani dispute over Pushtoonistan threatens to expand from a regional dispute into a cold war issue. Pakistani President Ayub has persuaded the British Government to issue an early statement reiterating its recognition of the Durand line--the existing border--as the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Afghans, who have accepted Soviet support in the dispute, will probably be angered by any such statement, regarding it as further evidence of free world support of Pakistan.

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*DK*

Belgian Congo: The failure of Belgian authorities to take effective action in the face of spreading tribal and election disorders in the Congo has reportedly damaged morale in the 28,000-man Force Publique, the main security force there. The consulate general in Leopoldville has characterized the governor general's threat to invoke a state of emergency as his strongest statement to date, but observes that it will be only an empty gesture unless backed by effective measures. In Brussels, the cabinet reportedly met on 13 May to discuss the Congo situation, and the press urged stronger security measures in the Congo.

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*DK*

France: The failure by more than 70 members of the Debré government majority to support the cabinet in the 11 May National Assembly vote on a proposed constitutional amendment may indicate that serious opposition is developing to the trend toward authoritarianism. If the amendment, which would permit newly independent African states to be members of the French Community, fails to

pass in the Senate, subsequent readings will have to be held. This could delay the planned June independence of the Mali Federation and the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar). 25X1

*W/O* Caribbean: [Colombian Foreign Minister Turbay told the American ambassador in Bogota on 10 May that action within the Organization of American States (OAS) against the Dominican Republic would provide a precedent for inter-American action against Cuba. The Colombian position is in line with that of Venezuelan President Betancourt, who in late April called the ouster of Trujillo from control in the Dominican Republic a prerequisite for any OAS effort to condemn the Castro regime. The Venezuelan drive to isolate Trujillo through persuading other Latin American governments to break relations is meeting opposition, although Venezuelan pressure for abandoning a wait-and-see policy seems to be having some effect.] 25X1

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Ratification of US-Japanese Treaty to Be Delayed Again

Prime Minister Kishi's efforts to obtain ratification of the new US-Japanese security treaty are encountering increasing opposition in the Diet. While the opposition Socialists have intensified their attacks on the treaty as a result of the U-2 plane incident, the greatest obstacle to ratification stems from attempts by Kishi's rivals in his own Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) to exact his promise to relinquish the premiership in exchange for their support on the treaty issue. Were he to agree, his resignation probably would be timed to coincide with the expiration of his term as party president next January.

The chairman of the LDP policy board has informed Ambassador MacArthur that the timetable for passage of the treaty by the lower house has had to be extended until some time late this month, with upper house approval to follow in about 30 days. New difficulties, however, may arise from the government's announced view on 10 May that the treaty does not prohibit US reconnaissance flights from Japan over Communist territory. Anti-Kishi elements of the LDP reportedly are holding out for even more time for lower house debate on the measure.

The Socialists appear likely to abstain from the vote on the measure and may even plan to resort to strong-arm tactics to try and prevent it. The government hopes the splinter Democratic Socialists will take part in the balloting, even if they vote against the treaty, so as to indicate that minority party rights are being respected. The Democratic Socialist party is being subjected to increasing pressure, however, to follow the Socialist lead and has indicated it will go along with a Socialist resolution demanding that the government negotiate a withdrawal of all U-2 aircraft from Japan.

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The Afghan-Pakistani dispute over Pushtoonistan appears to be in danger of being converted from a regional dispute to a cold war issue. Pakistani President Ayub has persuaded the British Government to issue a statement soon reiterating its recognition of the Durand line, originally drawn by the British in 1893, as the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The effective border today generally follows the Durand line. The Afghans will probably be angered by the British statement, no matter how moderately worded, and regard it as further evidence of free world support of Pakistan in the Pushtoonistan dispute.

Afghan-Pakistani propaganda exchanges have been intensified as a result of Pakistan's decision last September to abandon its policy of restraint--a policy generally endorsed by its CENTO allies--and to reply in kind to Afghan propaganda abuse. In view of Khrushchev's strong support for Kabul on the Pushtoonistan issue and the statement of 12 March to the press by the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan that the USSR does not recognize the Durand line, Rawalpindi wants its allies to take a more positive stand in its support.

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Kabul's reaction to free world support for Pakistan would probably take the form of increased reliance on Soviet support in pressing its Pushtoonistan campaign. This would make it more difficult for Afghanistan to maintain its neutrality.

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### III. THE WEST

#### Parliamentary Opposition to Debré Government May Be Strengthening

Failure by more than 70 members of the Debré government's majority to support the cabinet in the 11 May National Assembly vote on a proposed constitutional amendment may indicate that a serious opposition group is forming. The substance of the amendment--to permit newly independent African states to be members of the French Community--was not in question, and the proposal was passed by a vote of 280-174, with 88 abstentions. There was, however, strong criticism, led by the Socialists, of the government's choice of procedure for handling the amendment.

The government failed to justify to the assembly's satisfaction why it invoked in this matter the constitutional provision calling for a simple majority in both houses of parliament plus approval by the Community Senate rather than the constitutional provision calling for a three-fifths majority by both houses sitting as a special congress. There appeared to be widespread suspicion among the deputies that the government feared that parliament, when sitting as a congress, might "act up." The deputies were further irritated by the government's refusal to admit consideration of changes in its bill.

The opposition now threatens to carry the fight to the Senate, where it has a better chance of defeating the bill. A negative vote by the Senate could lead to lengthy shuttling of the bill between the two houses, risking delaying the June independence plans of the Mali Federation and the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar).

Parliamentary opposition to the Debré government is largely based on the regime's trend to authoritarianism and the declining influence of parliament. However, the increasing seriousness of this opposition may later present an occasion for the extreme right to undermine the authority of the regime.

[Colombian Foreign Minister Turbay told the American ambassador on 10 May that action within the Organization of American States (OAS) against the Dominican Republic would provide a precedent for inter-American action against Cuba. Turbay believes that accusing the unpopular Trujillo regime of intervention in the internal affairs of other Latin American countries would obtain the widest possible agreement of OAS members, who have always in previous years been reluctant to criticize any member specifically. The Colombian position is in line with that of Venezuelan President Betancourt, who stated in late April that ouster of Trujillo from control in the Dominican Republic was a prerequisite for any OAS effort to condemn the Castro regime.]

[Most Latin American governments have become increasingly irritated with Cuba in recent weeks, although few advocate OAS action at this time. Latin American ambassadors in Havana met with Fidel Castro on 10 May to impress Castro with their concern at Cuba's apparent abandoning of the Latin American community and at Cuba's deteriorating relations with the United States. The meeting was called by the Argentine ambassador without consultation with American Ambassador Bonsal. Canada--which apparently is considering joining the OAS--was represented at the meeting.]

[Despite Latin American concern, Bolivian President Siles stated on 11 May that his soundings as to the possibility of joint Latin American action on the Cuban problem had elicited the reaction that the time was not yet right. This may be a reflection in part of the feeling that the Dominican problem has priority.]

[Although Venezuelan pressure for abandoning a wait-and-see policy seems to be having some effect, and Bolivia on 14 May reportedly severed relations with the Dominican Republic, the Venezuelan drive to isolate Trujillo by persuading other Latin American governments to break relations is meeting opposition. The Chilean foreign minister believes that a diplomatic break by a government not directly concerned would border on intervention in internal Dominican affairs and that the Dominican problem should be handled in the OAS. The Argentine foreign minister also strongly opposes the Venezuelan suggestion for a diplomatic break.]

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Executive Offices of the White House

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Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

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Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

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The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

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The Director, The Joint Staff

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Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

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Commandant, United States Marine Corps

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Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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